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I. INTRODUCTION
Oklahoma has long provided for extensive pretrial discovery in civil
cases.1 Traditionally, however, discovery in criminal cases has been
much more limited.2 In fact, statutory discovery in criminal cases is al-
most nonexistent.3 The rather minimal discovery available has primarily
been the result of a progression of decisions by the Oklahoma Court of
1. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 3201-3232 (1991). For more on the history and nature of civil
discovery in Oklahoma, see generally 5 Okla. Discovery Prac. Manual (Butterworth Legal Publish-
ers) (1992); Charles W. Adams, CivilDiscovery in Oklahoma: Depositions, 17 TULSA L.J. 179 (1981);
Charles W. Adams, Civil Discovery in Oklahoma: The Discovery Tools, 16 TULSA L.J. 658 (1981);
Charles W. Adams, Civil Discovery in Oklahoma: General Principles, 16 TULSA L.J. 184 (1980);
Bruce W. Bowman, Note, Procedure: Pre-Trial Discovery, 2 OKLA. L. REv. 100 (1949); R. Dale
Vliet, Oklahoma Discovery Procedures, 2 OKLA. L. REv. 294 (1949).
2. See David W. Lee, The Need ForA New Criminal Discovery Code In Oklahoma State Courts
Requiring Disclosure of Investigative Reports to Defendants, 60 OKLA. B.J. 2259 (1989).
3. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 303 (1991) (requiring the prosecutor to endorse on the informa-
tion the "names and last-known address of all witnesses known to him at the time of the filing of the
same, intended to be called by him at a preliminary examination or at trial [and] ... the names and
last-known addresses of such other witnesses as may afterwards become known to him.., at such
time as the court may by rule prescribe"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 384 (1991) (providing for prosecu-
tions by indictment, the prosecutor must endorse on the indictment the names (but not the ad-
dresses) of the witnesses examined before the grand jury); see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 749 (1991)
(entitling the defendant to a copy of a "sworn statement of any person having knowledge of such
criminal offense" if such a statement has been obtained by the district attorney or any peace officer).
In addition to these statutory provisions, the Oklahoma Constitution requires that "in capital
cases, at least two days before the case is called for trial, [the accused] shall be furnished with a list of
the witnesses that will be called in chief, to prove the allegations of the indictment or information,
together with their post office addresses." OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20. Only two statutes currently
require the defendant to provide any information to the prosecution: OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 585
(1991) (requiring the defendant to give five days notice of an alibi defense although the only sanction
for noncompliance is to give the prosecution a continuance) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1176 (1991)
2
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Criminal Appeals.4 On December 20, 1990, that progression culminated
in the most comprehensive and far-reaching criminal discovery decision
in the history of Oklahoma, Allen v. District Court of Washington
County.5 The Allen decision made significant changes in the discovery
process, primarily affecting the types of information discoverable in crim-
inal cases and, to a lesser extent, the procedure for obtaining such
information.
This article provides a comprehensive examination of pretrial crimi-
nal discovery in Oklahoma subsequent to the Allen decision. The first
section discusses the procedural background of the Allen decision. The
following two sections discuss procedural and substantive changes result-
ing from Allen in Oklahoma criminal discovery. Particular attention is
paid to the source of the language used in the Allen decision and to areas
of ambiguity that need to be addressed by the court of criminal appeals.
The final section discusses miscellaneous discovery provisions not specifi-
cally provided for in the Allen decision.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE ALLEN DECISION
Indicted for murder in the District Court of Washington County,
Stephen Allen asked the district court to grant certain discovery re-
quests6 prior to the preliminary examination. 7 Citing two opinions of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the district court granted some of
the discovery requests but denied the rest.' Allen then filed a petition for
(requiring the defendant to give notice of a mental illness or insanity defense at least twenty days
before trial).
4. See generally Lee, supra note 2; 5 Okla. Crim. Prac. Manual (Butterworth Legal Publishers)
7-1 to -22 (1992).
5. 803 P.2d 1164 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990). One other article has been written about theAllen
decision. See generally Rodney J. Uphoff, The New Criminal Discovery Code in Oklahoma: A Two
Way Street in the Wrong Direction, 44 Okla. L. Rev. 387 (1991). The article is primarily a criticism
of the Allen decision's adverse impact on the adversary system and the defendants' privilege against
self-incrimination. The article also urges the Oklahoma legislature to adopt a proposed alternative
discovery code.
6. The Allen opinion fails to state the specific information requested by the defendant.
7. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 17 states that: "No person shall be prosecuted for a felony by
information without having had a preliminary examination before an examining magistrate, or hav-
ing waived such preliminary examination." Id. Since the term "preliminary examination" is used in
the Oklahoma Constitution, that term will be used instead of "preliminary hearing." The actual
preliminary examination is governed by OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 251-264 (1991). The traditional
purpose of the preliminary examination is to determine: "(1) whether the crime charged has been
committed and (2) whether there is probable cause to believe the accused committed it." Id.; Allen
v. State, 527 P.2d 204, 207 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974). For more on the preliminary examination in
Oklahoma, see Charles L. Cantrell, An Overview of the Preliminary Hearing in Oklahoma, 39 OKLA.
L. REV. 457 (1986).
8. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1165 (citing State v. Benson, 661 P.2d 908, 909 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983)
3
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writ of mandamus in the court of criminal appeals seeking an order di-
recting the court to grant his requests for pre-preliminary examination
discovery.9 Thus, the central issue presented to the court of criminal
appeals was essentially procedural: Whether an examining magistrate
possesses the authority to grant a discovery request prior to a prelimi-
nary examination. As discussed below, the court not only resolved that
issue, but also used Allen as a vehicle for making substantial changes
regarding material subject to pretrial discovery.
The court began its discussion of discovery procedure with an analy-
sis of the historical development of Oklahoma's court system, including
discourse concerning the old system of courts of limited and general ju-
risdiction as compared to the current unified system. The court recog-
nized that its previous decisions "failed to interpret and apply the
existing statutory provisions as we transitioned into a unified court sys-
tem." 10 As a result, its jurisprudence was "confusing" and had "bent the
statutory procedure to the present breaking point.""1
Prior to the adoption and implementation of the current unified
court system,12 the Oklahoma court system comprised a combination of
constitutional and statutory courts of both limited and general jurisdic-
tion. The Oklahoma Constitution established the district courts, county
courts, courts of the justice of the peace, and municipal courts.1 3 The
legislature created the court of common pleas and the superior court. 14
Once the unified system was adopted, each of the these constitutional and
statutory courts were consolidated into the current district courts which
are courts of general jurisdiction."5 District judges and associate district
judges became general jurisdiction judges of the district courts. 6 Special
(supporting the denial of pre-preliminary examination discovery due to prematurity) and Stafford v.
District Court of Okla. County, 595 P.2d 797, 798 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (indicating the lack of
authority possessed by a magistrate to compel production of discovery material)).
9. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1164.
10. Id. at 1165.
11. Id.
12. The current unified court system was adopted by a vote of the people on State Question No.
448, Legislative Referendum No. 164 on July 11, 1967. The system became effective on January 13,
1969.
13. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (amended 1981).
14. OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 651 (1961) (creating the court of common pleas); OxLA. STAT. tit.
20, § 141 (1961) (creating the superior courts).
15. OMA. CONST. art. 7, § 7(a) (providing that the district court possesses unlimited original
jurisdiction in all justiciable controversies).
16. OLA. CONST. art. 7, § 8(d) (providing that district court judges and associate district
judges "shall exercise all jurisdiction in the District Court except as otherwise provided by law").
[Vol. 28:69
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judges, however, are still limited jurisdiction judges although they pre-
side in courts of general jurisdiction.' 7
The confusion over whether the judge presiding over a preliminary
examination possesses the authority to order pre-preliminary examina-
tion discovery stems from the fact that the statutes which regulated pre-
liminary examination in the days of courts of limited jurisdiction still
regulate preliminary examination in the days of courts of general juris-
diction. For instance, the statutes regulating preliminary examination"8
refer to the various duties of a "magistrate" although that term is not
used in the constitutional provisions establishing the current unified
court system.19 The only judicial officers referred to in the current provi-
sions are district judges, associate district judges, and special judges.20
The repealed sections of the constitution establishing county courts and
courts of the justice of the peace specifically provide that such courts
"shall also have and exercise the jurisdiction of examining and commit-
ting magistrates in all criminal cases."" Thus, the current difficulty em-
anates from the need, or at least the perceived need, to reconcile the use
of the antiquated term "magistrate" in the statutes governing prelimi-
nary examinations with the provisions establishing the modem unified
system which do not use the term.
Under the old system of limited jurisdiction county courts and
courts of the justice of the peace, it was quite reasonable for the court of
criminal appeals to hold that the judges possessed limited jurisdiction
with respect to conducting pre-preliminary examination. For example,
17. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 8(h) (providing that jurisdiction of special judges may be
limited as prescribed by statute); OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 123A (1991) (limiting the jurisdiction of
special judges to specific actions in criminal cases). Section 123A states:
5. Misdemeanors, except that special judges who are not lawyers may not hear criminal
actions where the punishment prescribed by law exceeds a fine of Two Hundred Dollars
($200.00), or imprisonment in a county jail for thirty (30) days, or both such fine and
imprisonment except by written consent of all parties.
6. Felonies involving a second and subsequent offense of driving, operating, or being in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any other
intoxicating substance, including any controlled dangerous substance as defined in the Uni-
form Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, to a degree that renders the defendant incapa-
ble of safely driving or operating a motor vehicle, except that nonlawyer special judges may
not hear such matters ....
8. Issuance of writs of habeas corpus, but this paragraph shall not embrace nonlawyer
special judges.
9. Perform the duties of magistrate in criminal cases.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 123A (1991).
18. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 251-276 (1991).
19. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 7, 8.
20. Id.
21. OKLA. CONST. art VII, §§ 17, 18 (repealed 1961).
1992]
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the court of criminal appeals indicated "[i]n felony cases the jurisdiction
of a justice of the peace is either to discharge the accused or else hold him
to answer the felony charged or some other felony (which the evidence
may disclose the accused to have committed) within the territorial limits
of the county."22 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma similarly stated that:
"[C]onstruing all of the statutes together, we hold that the justices of the
peace have no power to try and determine any criminal action excepting
such as they are by specific enactment given power to try and deter-
mine."23 Although district court judges, except special judges, no longer
have limited jurisdiction, the court of criminal appeals continues to apply
such limited jurisdiction pursuant to the present statutory scheme for
conducting preliminary examinations.24 The primary reason for this
seems to be the fact that the preliminary examination statutes, essentially
the same as when they were passed in 1910, still refer to the person pre-
siding over the examination as a "magistrate." And, as just noted, mag-
istrates possessed limited jurisdiction. Thus, whenever a judge sitting in
a court of general jurisdiction presides over a preliminary examination,
the judge is treated as a judge of limited jurisdiction.
Reconciliation between the antiquated system and the current uni-
fied system seemed possible at the beginning of the Allen decision.25 In
fact, the court initially intimated that it might reverse itself on the issue
of whether a judge presiding at a preliminary examination could order
discovery prior to the preliminary examination. However, after a some-
what lengthy discussion of the procedural issue, the court concluded by
simply stating that the statutory scheme regulating preliminary examina-
tions did not allow the court to "interpret them in such a manner as to
approve discovery prior to preliminary examination."26 As a result, the
court denied the requested writ of mandamus.27
22. West v. State, 217 P. 1067, 1068 (Okla. Crim. App. 1923).
23. R.M. Collier v. Territory of Oklahoma, 37 P. 819, 822 (Okla. 1894).
24. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 251-280 (1991); see also State v. Gorelick, 746 P.2d 677, 678 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1987); Moss v. Hicks, 738 P.2d 155, 156 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); State v. Benson, 661
P.2d 908, 909 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); State v. Kile, 250 P.2d 233, 234 (Okla. Crim. App. 1952).
25. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1165.
26. Id. (citing Stafford v. District Court of Okla. County, 595 P.2d 797 (Okla. Crim. App.
1979)).
27. Although the court felt constrained by statutory provisions with respect to the timing of
pretrial discovery, it did not feel constrained with respect to the information required to be disclosed.
For this reason, Judges Lane and Brett dissented from the portion of the Allen decision which, in
effect, created a new criminal discovery code. Judges Lane and Brett expressed reservations about
constructing a new discovery code, which is arguably an infringement on the role of the Oklahoma
legislature. In a post-Allen decision the court of criminal appeals reaffirmed that "our previous order
in Allen was not unconstitutional nor did it violate or exceed the authority of the Court of Criminal
[Vol. 28:69
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III. PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
This section first discusses the major procedural issue addressed in
the Allen decision: the timing of pretrial discovery. Next, this section
considers the continuing validity of several procedural issues not ad-
dressed in Allen. These issues include: the required specificity of a
discovery request, the continued availability of information prior to the
preliminary examination, and whether the court might enforce discovery
more forcefully on appeal.
Due to the limited nature of the preliminary examination and the
lack of authority possessed by the presiding judge, pretrial discovery may
not be ordered prior to the preliminary examination. The court found
that upon entry of the bindover order,28 the district court is empowered
to hear any pretrial motions, including requests for discovery. Although
the court recognized that the assigned judge may issue a discovery order
at any time following the bindover, it suggested that the most appropri-
ate time to do so is at the formal arraignment.2 9 The court further stated
that the trial judge "should enter a written order setting forth discovery,
inspection and copying requirements for each party and a time for com-
pliance.""-  The significant procedural difference between Allen and pre-
vious law is Allen's requirement that discovery be completed ten days
prior to trial.31 Former procedure, in contrast, allowed the judge discre-
tion to compel discovery within a reasonable time before trial.32
Since the Allen opinion did not address other procedural aspects of
pretrial discovery, it is unclear whether those procedures remain un-
changed. For example, in a previous case, Watts v. State,3 3 the court
addressed the issue of specificity of a discovery request and held that a
blanket discovery request would generally not be granted.34 Specifically,
the court held that a request for "the following papers, to wit: any and all
Appeals ...." State v. Blevins, 825 P.2d 270, 272 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). Any further discussion
of the court's authority to issue the Allen decision is beyond the scope of this article.
28. OKLA. STAT. tit 22, § 264 (1991) (providing that if it appears from the examination that
any public offense has been committed, and sufficient cause exists to believe the defendant committed
such offense, the magistrate must endorse an order on the complaint ordering the defendant to be
held to answer the charge, otherwise known as a bindover order).
29. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 451-470 (1991) (governing formal arraignments); see also 5 Okla.
Crim. Prac. Manual (Butterworth Legal Publishers) 4-3 to -16 (1992).
30. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
31. Id.
32. State v. Benson, 661 P.2d 908, 909 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
33. Bettlyoun v. State, 562 P.2d 862, 866 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); Wing v. State, 490 P.2d
1376, 1383 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
34. 487 P.2d 981 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
1992]
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statements made by defendant herein," was not a request for the content
of oral statements.35 Thus, under previous law, discovery requests
needed to be sufficiently specific in order to be granted. Whether such
specificity will be required afterAllen is not clear. Under Allen, the pros-
ecuting attorney must disclose "all of the material and information
within the state's possession or control .... ,36 Since this is apparently
intended to create an open file policy, 37 a continued requirement of rigid
specificity would seem to defeat it.
Although the Allen decision reaffirmed that discovery is not avail-
able until after the preliminary examination, the decision did not address
issues relating to the continued availability of information required to be
disclosed prior to the preliminary examination. Previously, the court of
criminal appeals held that conviction records of witnesses called to testify
at the preliminary examination would be available to defendants.38 In
addition, the court indicated that grand jury transcripts would also be
accessible to defendants.3 9 It is not clear from the Allen decision whether
such information will continue to be disclosed prior to the preliminary
examination or whether it need only be made available at the same time
as other discoverable information.
It is also not clear what prerequisites for relief a defendant must
satisfy on appeal in the event requested information is not disclosed pre-
trial. Previous law made it difficult for a defendant to obtain relief, even
when the state did not disclose the limited information previously re-
quired. The first requirement is that the defendant not have independent
knowledge or access to the requested information.' Second, it must be
proven that the denial of the requested information substantially
prejudiced the defendant.41 The factors considered in assessing prejudi-
cial effect seem designed to preclude relief. These factors include:
(1) whether the defendant requested a continuance;42 (2) whether the
35. Id. at 986.
36. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
37. See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
38. Stafford v. District Court of Okla. County, 595 P.2d 797, 798-99 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979);
Stevenson v. State, 486 P.2d 646, 650 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
39. English v. District Court of Adair County, 492 P.2d 1125, 1126 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
40. Castleberry v. Crisp, 414 F. Supp. 945, 950 (N.D. Okla. 1976); Hammer v. State, 760 P.2d
200, 204 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Hall v. State, 751 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988);
Wilhite v. State, 701 P.2d 774, 777 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); Gregg v. State, 662 P.2d 1385, 1388
(Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
41. Hall, 751 P.2d at 1093; Silver v. State, 737 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987);
Farmer v. State, 565 P.2d 1068, 1073 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); Wing v. State, 490 P.2d 1376, 1382-
83 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Stevenson, 486 P.2d at 650.
42. Ziegler v. State, 610 P.2d 251, 256 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); Wing, 490 P.2d at 1383.
[Vol. 28:69
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 28 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss1/3
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY AFTER ALLEN
defendant sought a writ of mandamus before the court of criminal ap-
peals;43 and (3) whether the information was ultimately revealed at
trial.4
The Allen decision may indicate that the court is willing to alter
these almost insurmountable prerequisites for appellate relief. Such will-
ingness is evidenced by two primary factors which motivated the court of
criminal appeals to decide Allen: "the pressing need to fill the gaps
which currently exist within our statutory framework," and, presumably,
to resolve the problem that the court "is continually confronted with is-
sues on appeal relating to compliance with pre-trial discovery."'45 While
the Allen decision is clearly designed to resolve these motivating issues at
the trial level by requiring increased disclosure, Allen may also be a sig-
nal that the court intends to alter its previous role in discovery and en-
force discovery more forcefully on appeal.
IV. INFORMATION SUBJECT TO DISCLOSURE
Statutory discovery has been and remains rather limited in
Oklahoma.46 Most of the required discovery arises from case law.47
Even before Allen, the court of criminal appeals required the state to
43. Ziegler, 610 P.2d at 256; Wing, 490 P.2d at 1383.
44. Nauni v. State, 670 P.2d 126, 132 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Stevenson, 486 P.2d at 650.
45. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
46. See supra note 3 and sources cited therein.
47. See supra note 4 and sources cited therein.
1992]
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disclose to the defendant scientific and technical reports,48 tangible evi-
dence,49 exculpatory evidence,50 the defendant's own custodial state-
ments and the substance of oral ones,51 criminal records of witnesses, 52
evidence of lineups," evidence of other crimes, 54 and the terms of a plea
bargain between the district attorney and a witness." Despite the previ-
ous availability of such information, the Allen decision significantly in-
creased the amount and the nature of the information required to be
disclosed through pretrial discovery. This section discusses the informa-
tion subject to disclosure after the Allen decision. Specifically, the sec-
tion discusses two categories of required disclosures delineated by Allen:
disclosures required of the State and disclosures required of the
defendant. 56
A. Disclosures by the State
1. Material and Information Within the State's Possession or
Control
The section of Allen requiring disclosure by the State provides that,
48. Moore v. State, 740 P.2d 731, 735 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (concerning test results of
alleged controlled substance); Bettlyoun v. State, 562 P.2d 862, 866 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (con.
taining general statement of the law); Abshire v. State, 551 P.2d 273, 274 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976)
(referencing results of breathalyzer test pursuant to OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 752 (1971)); Hamm v.
State, 516 P.2d 825, 826 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (referencing ballistics report); Shapard v. State,
437 P.2d 565, 594 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968) (containing medical report in rape case).
49. Moore, 740 P.2d at 735; Ziegler v. State, 610 P.2d 251, 255-56 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980)
(requiring sperm slides in a rape case); Stafford v. District Court of Okla. County, 595 P.2d 797, 799
(Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (requiring fingerprints); Melton v. State, 512 P.2d 204, 205 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1973) (requiring the film subject to an obscenity prosecution); Stevenson v. State, 486 P.2d 646,
649 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (requiring death weapon).
50. Van White v. State, 752 P.2d 814, 819 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). See generally Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and infra notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
51. Stout v. State, 693 P.2d 617, 624-25 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Watts v. State, 487 P.2d 981,
986 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). However, disclosure is not required where the statement is not the
product of police custodial interrogation. See Hollan v. State, 676 P.2d 861, 864 (Okla. Crim. App.
1984); Jones v. State, 660 P.2d 634, 641 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). The defendant is not entitled to
notes taken by a detective when questioning the defendant. Perez v. State, 614 P,2d 1112, 1115
(Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
52. Housley v. State, 785 P.2d 315, 316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); Stafford, 595 P.2d at 798-99;
Bettlyoun, 562 P.2d at 866; Stevenson, 486 P.2d at 650. Although other discoverable information
need not be disclosed prior to preliminary examination, case law prior to Allen required that the
conviction record of intended witnesses be provided prior to such hearing. Stafford, 595 P.2d at 798-
99; Stevenson, 486 P.2d at 649-50.
53. Thompson v. State, 438 P.2d 287, 289 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968).
54. Holt v. State, 774 P.2d 476,477 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); Burks v. State, 594 P.2d 771, 774
(Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
55. Binsz v. State, 675 P.2d 448,451 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Mays v. State, 594 P.2d 777, 779
(Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
56. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167 (referencing the required disclosure provisions).
10
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upon the defense's request, "the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to
defense counsel all of the material and information within the prosecu-
tor's possession or control."57 This provision is followed by a list of spe-
cific items required of the State, discussed in the following sections.
Although this list of specific disclosures marks a significant change from
previous law, the more general provision promises to have a greater im-
pact on the extent of defense discovery in Oklahoma by requiring an
open Me policy of the State.
Although the ultimate meaning of this pronouncement may be diffi-
cult to discern, it appears to require the State to have an "open file"
policy in dealing with the defense. Even though the provision is followed
by a list of specific items that must be disclosed, the list is not exhaustive
because it is preceded by the phrase "including but not limited to."' 58
Thus, the Allen decision clearly contemplates that the required disclo-
sures are not limited to the list of specific items.
This interpretation is supported by comparing the language of State
disclosure requirements with the language of defense disclosure require-
ments. While the court requires the State to disclose "all" of the material
in its possession, no such requirement is imposed on the defense. In-
stead, by enumerating the items subject to disclosure, Allen limits the
information the defense must relinquish.59 Moreover, the court does not
state that the defendants' list is inclusive rather than exclusive. Thus, the
court imposes a broader obligation on the State to disclose information.
Furthermore, in interpreting the meaning of the court's statements,
it is helpful to look to the sources of the language used. The Allen court
relied on the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice
(ABA Standards) relating to pretrial discovery and the appropriate scope
of discovery.' ° In fact, the language in Allen discussed above is taken
57. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
58. Id.
59. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
60. See generally STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 11-1.1 to 11-5.4 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinaf-
ter ABA STANDARD]. The court also stated that it looked to other authorities, including the Model
Penal Code, for guidance. However, the Model Penal Code does not contain any provisions relating
to discovery. Thus, it would appear that the court actually meant to refer to the Uniform Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which, like the Model Penal Code, are proposed by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See generally UNiFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
10 U.L.A. 15 (Master ed. 1976 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter UNIFORM RULES]. In addition, the Allen
decision does in fact borrow some language from the Uniform Rules. See infra notes 163, 178, 222,
and 229 and accompanying text.
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verbatim from standard 11-2.1.6" According to the commentary accom-
panying standard 11-2.1, "upon a defense request, the prosecutor is to
provide open file disclosure and include an illustrative (but not exhaus-
tive) list of items that the prosecutor is to routinely disclose to defense
counsel.",62 The Allen court did "not adopt those recommended proce-
dures by reference"63 but drew upon them in determining the procedure
to be followed. Thus, it is possible that the court qualified its use of the
ABA Standards to avoid being bound by the commentary or by other
interpretations of those standards.
The significance of this "open file" disclosure provision is further
enhanced by the requirement articulated in Allen that this and subse-
quent disclosures extend to material and information "in the possession
or control of members of the prosecutor's staff and of any others who
regularly report or, with respect to the particular case, have reported to
the prosecutor's office."6 Although not verbatim, Allen's language is es-
sentially derived from the ABA Standards.65 The commentary to this
section states that "[t]he 'possession and control' requirement protects
the state against the claim that the state is responsible even for informa-
tion not uncovered and protects the defendant against the claim that the
prosecutor was personally unaware of the material or information." 66
2. Witnesses and Witness Statements
The first specific category of material to be disclosed by the State is
"the names and addresses of witnesses, together with their relevant oral,
written or recorded statement, or summaries of same."67 While this is
based on the ABA Standards, the requirement in Allen goes significantly
beyond the ABA Standards by requiring the disclosure of oral statements
made by the witnesses.68 This addition would seem to give the defendant
61. ABA STANDARD 11-2.1.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
64. Id. at 1168.
65. ABA STANDARD 11-2.1(d). Section 11-2.1(d) provides:
The prosecuting attorney's obligation under this standard extends to material and informa-
tion in the possession or control of members of the prosecutor's staff and of any others who
have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly
report or, with reference to the particular case, have reported to the prosecutor's office.
Id (the emphasized phrase is not in the Allen opinion).
66. Id.
67. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
68. ABA STANDARD 11-2.1(a)(i) (requiring disclosure of "the names and addresses of wit-
nesses, together with their relevant written or recorded statements").
[Vol. 28:69
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access to any statements made by State witnesses without the necessity of
quibbling over the form in which the statement was made.
This provision marks a significant departure from previous Okla-
homa law. Previous law only required the disclosure of the "sworn state-
ment of any person having knowledge of such criminal offense" if such a
statement had been obtained by the district attorney or any peace of-
ficer.69 Unsworn statements of witnesses constituted work product and
were not generally discoverable.70 Under previous law, no statements
had to be disclosed to the defense unless the statements were taken under
oath.71 Allen, on the other hand, asserts that irrespective of whether the
statement is under oath, the State must disclose all relevant "oral, writ-
ten or recorded statements."
72
The Allen decision does not incorporate the ABA standard relating
to grand jury minutes,73 presumably because Oklahoma law already
makes grand jury transcripts available to the defendant.7 4 This provision
is also applicable to grand jury proceedings under the Multicounty Grand
69. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 749 (1991). Section 749 provides:
A. In the investigation of a criminal offense, the district attorney or any peace officer may
take the sworn statement of any person having knowledge of such criminal offense. Any
person charged with a crime shall be entitled to a copy of any such sworn statement upon
the same being obtained.
B. If a witness in a criminal proceeding gives testimony upon a material issue of the case
contradictory to his previous sworn statement, evidence may be introduced that such wit-
ness has previously made a statement under oath contradictory to such testimony.
Id.
70. Nauni v. State, 670 P.2d 126, 133 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Ray v. State, 510 P.2d 1395,
1399 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); State ex rel. Fallis v. Truesdell, 493 P.2d 1134, 1137 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1972); Shapard v. State, 437 P.2d 565, 594 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967).
71. To the extent that a witness used a previous statement to refresh his memory either while
testifying or before testifying, the Oklahoma Evidence Code provides for the disclosure of such state-
ments to the adverse party after the witness has testified. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2612 (1991). This
disclosure during the course of the trial is, of course, not considered traditional discovery. Previous
law might also have required disclosure of an unsworn statement if the statement tended to negate
the guilt of the defendant or reduce the punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
72. But see Fritz v. State, 811 P.2d 1353, 1358 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (representing a post-
Allen case in which the court is unclear as to the prosecutor's duty to disclose unsworn statements of
witnesses made to law enforcement officers).
73. ABA STANDARD 1l-2.1(a)(iii) (providing for disclosure of "those portions of grand jury
minutes containing testimony of the accused and relevant testimony of witnesses").
74. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 340 (1991). Section 340 provides:
A qualified court reporter shall be present and take the testimony of all witnesses and upon
request a transcript of said testimony or any portion thereof shall be made available to an
accused or the district attorney, at the request of the requesting party or officer, and, in the
event of an indigent accused, at the expense of the state.
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Jury Act.75 A defendant charged by information is entitled to a tran-
script of grand jury testimony even when the grand jury returns no in-
dictment against the defendant.7 6
The required disclosure of witnesses is consistent with current
Oklahoma statutes and constitutional provisions. Title 22, section 303 of
the Oklahoma Statutes requires the prosecutor to endorse the names and
addresses of intended witnesses on the information. When the prosecu-
tion is by indictment, a similar provision requires the prosecutor to en-
dorse on the indictment the names (but not the addresses) of the
witnesses examined before the grand jury.7 7 Article II, section 20 of the
Oklahoma Constitution provides that in capital cases the accused be fur-
nished a list of intended witnesses. A defendant is charged with notice
that a codefendant may testify, and thus it is unnecessary to endorse the
codefendant's name as a witness.78 In addition, the court has held that
the prosecutor is not required to endorse a witness whose testimony is
clearly offered in rebuttal.7 9 Whether these limitations on the State's
duty to disclose witnesses have survived the Allen case remains to be
decided.
Under these statutory witness disclosure provisions, the trial court
has discretion to permit the endorsement of the names of additional wit-
nesses at any time, even after the trial has commenced. 0 Such late en-
dorsement of witnesses will not be a ground for reversal unless it
affirmatively appears that the defendant experienced prejudice in the
preparation and presentation of his defense.81 If the defendant is sur-
prised by the endorsement of additional witnesses and such endorsement
requires additional time for preparation, the defendant should withdraw
any announcement of being ready for trial and seek a postponement or
continuance by setting out facts constituting the surprise and any other
evidence which could be produced to rebut the testimony of such witness
75. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 350 (1991); Rush v. Blasdel, 804 P.2d 1140, 1141 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1991).
76. Rush, 804 P.2d at 1191 (overruling State ex rel. Fallis v. Miracle, 494 P.2d 676 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1972)); see also English v. District Court of Adair County, 492 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1972) (establishing procedures for actually obtaining the transcript).
77. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 384 (1991).
78. Ashley v. State, 520 P.2d 686, 689 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974); Schneider v. State, 501 P.2d
868, 870 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
79. Johnston v. State, 673 P.2d 844, 849 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Martin v. State, 596 P.2d
899, 901 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
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if the case were continued.12 Failure to do so win be considered a waiver
of any surprise or error which may have existed."3
3. Statements by Defendant or Codefendant
The State is also specifically required to disclose "any written or
recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by
the accused or . . . a codefendant."84 Previous law only required the
disclosure of statements made to law enforcement officers, not statements
made to private citizens.85 Since the court of criminal appeals previously
made a distinction between statements made to law enforcement officers
and statements made to others, it would appear that the failure of the
court to make such a distinction in the Allen case indicates a desire to
abandon that distinction. Thus, defendants' and codefendants' state-
ments seem to be subject to disclosure irrespective of to whom they were
made.
This position is further supported by the fact that this specific re-
quired disclosure is contained in a general provision that requires the
state to disclose the entirety of material and information within the con-
trol or possession of the prosecutor. Any continued limitation on the
disclosure of statements made to persons other than law enforcement of-
ficers would obviously be inconsistent with this general "open file"
policy.
4. Reports and Statements Made by Experts
Under Allen, other specific disclosures required of a prosecutor in-
clude "any reports or statements made by experts in connection with the
particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and
of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons."86 This language is taken
verbatim from the ABA Standards.7 The commentary to those stan-
dards states that if such reports or statements are made in connection
with the particular case,88 the reports must be disclosed whether or not
82. Thomas v. State, 811 P.2d 1337, 1341-42 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
83. Id.
84. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167-68.
85. Hollan v. State, 676 P.2d 861, 864 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Jones v. State, 660 P.2d 634,
641 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). Previously, a defendant was not entitled to notes taken by a law
enforcement officer while questioning the defendant. Perez v. State, 614 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1980); Smith v. State, 462 P.2d 328, 330 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969).
86. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
87. ABA STANDARD 11-2.1(a)(iv).
88. The requirement that reports be made in connection with a particular case was adopted
from former Rule 16(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2)
1992]
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the contents of the reports help the State and whether or not the State
intends to use the reports at trial.8 9 The commentary further suggests
that the type of reports discoverable pursuant to this standard would
include "autopsy reports, reports of medical examinations of victims, of
any psychiatric examination of the accused, of chemical analyses, of
blood tests.., and the like." 9
This requirement of Allen comports with previous law in Oklahoma.
The court of criminal appeals previously mandated disclosure of techni-
cal reports such as highly technical and lengthy engineering and labora-
tory reports, 91 ballistics reports,92 and the results of breathalyzer tests.93
However, the court characterized police investigative reports as "non-
technical work product" not subject to disclosure.94
5. Documents and Tangible Objects
The State must also disclose to a defendant "any books, papers, doc-
uments, photographs, tangible objects, buildings, or places which the
prosecuting attorney intends to use in the hearing or trial or which were
obtained from or belong to the accused." 95 Like other provisions in Al-
len, this language is derived from the ABA Standards.96 Other similar
disclosure provisions do not require the disclosure of such items be tied
to the State's intent to introduce the evidence. For example, the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Federal Rules) authorize disclosure when
the items are "material to the preparation of" the defense.97 The Uni-
form Rules of Criminal Procedure (Uniform Rules) require disclosure of
such items that are "related in any way to the case."98 The commentary
to the ABA Standards diminishes the significance of this difference in
language by pointing out that "the standard's shift to open file disclosure
(1966). The limitation in the current rules indicates that reports "material to the preparation of the
defense or... intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the trial" are the pertinent
documents. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D).
89. ABA STANDARD 11-2.1(a)(iv) cmt.
90. Id.
91. Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990); Moore v. State, 740 P.2d 731,
732-34 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); Layman v. State, 355 P.2d 444, 446 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960).
92. Hamm v. State, 516 P.2d 825, 826 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
93. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 752 (1991); Abshire v. State, 551 P.2d 273, 274 (Okla. Crim. App.
1976).
94. Trowbridge v. State, 502 P.2d 495, 503-04 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); see also Bettlyoun v.
State, 562 P.2d 862, 866 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); State ex rel. Fallis v. Truesdale, 493 P.2d 1134,
1136 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
95. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
96. ABA STANDARD 11-2.1(a)(v).
97. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a)(1)(C).
98. UNIFORM RULES 421(a) (Supp. 1987).
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has the effect of making available to the defense any relevant objects that
are within the prosecutor's possession or control." 99
The requirement in Allen that the prosecutor disclose such docu-
ments and tangible objects marks a departure from prior Oklahoma case
law. The court of criminal appeals has long required the disclosure of
this type of evidence. Specifically, the court requires disclosure of an
alleged death weapon and any reports concerning a weapon, 1°° docu-
ments,101 sperm slides in a rape case,'02 a film which is the subject of an
obscenity prosecution," a sample of an alleged controlled substance for
use in an independent chemical analysis,"° and copies of fingerprints.0 5
6. Criminal Records of Defendants and Codefendants
Allen also requires the disclosure of "any record of prior criminal
convictions of the defendant, or of any codefendant."" 6 This require-
ment is also taken verbatim from the ABA Standards. 7 This standard
expands the Federal Rules and the Uniformn Rules, both of which require
only the disclosure of the prior criminal record of the defendant. 108 The
commentary to the ABA Standards points out that while the disclosure of
the defendant's criminal record in no way disadvantages the State, such
information is important to the defense on such issues as whether the
defendant should plead guilty, testify at trial, or move to exclude the use
of prior convictions for impeachment purposes.' 9
The requirement that the state disclose the prior criminal record of
the codefendant is new to Oklahoma law. Prior law only required the
disclosure of the criminal record of intended witnesses.1 0 The require-
ment in Allen that a codefendant's record be disclosed is not contingent
99. ABA STANDARD 11-2.1(a)(v).
100. Stevenson v. State, 486 P.2d 646, 649 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Doakes v. District Court of
Okla. County, 447 P.2d 461, 464 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968).
101. In re Killian, 338 P.2d 168, 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959).
102. Ziegler v. State, 610 P.2d 251, 255-56 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
103. See generally Melton v. State, 512 P.2d 204, 205 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
104. Moore v. State, 740 P.2d 731, 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).
105. Stafford v. District Court of Okla. County, 595 P.2d 797, 799 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
106. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
107. ABA STANDARD 11-2.1(a)(vi).
108. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(B); UNIFoRM RULES 422(b) (Supp. 1987). Although the Uni-
form Rules do not specifically authorize the discovery of the criminal record of codefendants, such
records may be discoverable pursuant to Rule 422(a) which requires the disclosure of "all matters
... which relate in any way to the case." Id.
109. ABA STANDARD 11-2.1(a)(vi).
110. Housley v. State, 785 P.2d 315, 316-17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); Stafford v. District Court
of Okla. County, 595 P.2d 797, 799 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979); Bettlyoun v. State, 562 P.2d 862, 865-
66 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); Stevenson v. State, 486 P.2d 646, 650 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
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on the intended use of the codefendant as a witness. This point is made
particularly clear by the fact the Allen decision contains a separate provi-
sion requiring the disclosure of the record of intended witnesses."'1
7. Record Check of Possible Witnesses
In addition to requiring the disclosure of the criminal record of the
defendant and any codefendant, Allen requires the disclosure of "OSBI
or FBI rap sheet/records check on any witness listed by the State or the
Defense as a possible witness who will testify at trial."'1 2 This provision
goes beyond the ABA Standards which require disclosure of such records
only if the prosecutor already has the prior record on hand.1 3 The Uni-
form Rules only require the State to provide the criminal record of in-
tended State witnesses and only "so far as reasonably ascertainable by the
prosecuting attorney." '114 This provision seems to impose on the State
the duty to actually conduct a record check of the possible witnesses
rather than limit the disclosure to information within the prosecutor's
actual knowledge. This provision goes beyond prior law and the Uni-
form Rules by requiring the disclosure of the criminal record of defense
witnesses in addition to State witnesses.' 1 5
8. Brady Material
Finally, the Allen decision states that the "prosecuting attorney shall
disclose to defense counsel any material or information within the prose-
cutor's possession or control' 16 which tends to negate the guilt of the
accused as to the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the
punishment of the accused." '117 Once again, this language is taken di-
rectly from the ABA Standards."I Those standards adopt the definition
of exculpatory material from Brady v. Maryland119 which held that
"[t]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
Although other discoverable information need not be disclosed prior to the preliminary examination
the conviction record of intended witnesses must be provided prior to such examination. Id.
111. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
112. Id.
113. See ABA STANDARD 11-2.1(a)(vi) cmt.
114. UNIFORM RULES 422(b)(2) (Supp. 1987).
115. Stafford v. District Court of Okla. County, 595 P.2d 797, 799 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
116. The Allen decision extends this obligation "to material and information in the possession or
control of members of the prosecutor's staff and of any others who either regularly report or, with
respect to the particular case, have reported to the prosecutor's office." Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168. For
more on this obligation see supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
117. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
118. ABA STANDARD 11-2.1(c).
119. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution."1 20
Although the other disclosures are required only upon request, this
provision does not contain a request requirement. This may indicate an
attempt to be consistent with the current constitutional requirement for
disclosure of exculpatory material which seems not to be dependent on a
request for the exculpatory material.
In Brady, the defendant made a specific request for exculpatory ma-
terial, and, in United States v. Agurs, 2 the Court emphasized the impor-
tance of making a specific request for disclosure of material evidence by
fashioning different tests for materiality depending on the specificity of
the request. If a specific request for information is denied, that informa-
tion will be considered material if it "might have affected the outcome of
the trial." 122 In contrast, if no specific request has been made and the
State fails to disclose some exculpatory information, that information
will be considered material only if it can be said that "the omitted evi-
dence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.
123
Although the determination whether a request is specific or general must
generally be made on a case by case basis, the Agurs court did state that a
request for "all Brady material" would be treated as though no request
had been made. 124
In United States v. Bagley,12 however, the Supreme Court cast con-
siderable doubt on the Agurs distinction between specific and general re-
quests. Although there was no majority opinion, five justices seemed to
agree that the appropriate test for "materiality," in all instances of
prosecutorial failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, should be whether
"there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 126
While three justices found it unnecessary to address the relevance of the
specificity of the defense request, the other two reasoned that, in applying
that standard, a court must take into account the greater potential for
prejudice in a specific request case.127 More importantly, though, the
120. Id at 87.
121. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
122. Id. at 104.
123. Id. at 112.
124. Id. at 107.
125. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
126. Id. at 682.
127. Id. at 685 (Burger, C.J., White, J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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court of criminal appeals considers Bagley to have created a single test
for materiality in those cases where the defendant makes a specific re-
quest, a general request, or no request for Brady material.12
B. Disclosures by the Defense
The section of the Allen decision requiring the defense to disclose
certain information represents a major departure from previous Okla-
homa law. Under prior law, the only information required to be dis-
closed by the defense was a notice of alibi129 and notice of a mental
illness or insanity defense. 130 Of course, the State could still take advan-
tage of various investigative techniques such as lineups, interrogation,
and searches and seizures, but these are not generally considered discov-
ery devices.
Although the required defense disclosures under Allen are substan-
tial, they are not nearly as extensive as the disclosures required of the
State. For example, the defense disclosure section does not contain lan-
guage requiring the defense to disclose "all of the material and informa-
tion" in its possession, as does the State disclosure provision.1 31 Instead,
the decision simply includes a list of the specific items subject to disclo-
sure, which are discussed in the following sections.
1. Witnesses and Witness' Statements
The first specific category of material to be disclosed by the defense
is "the names and addresses of witnesses, together with their relevant
oral, written or recorded statement, or summaries of same." '132 This lan-
guage is identical to the language used to describe the State's duty to
disclose and appears to have been chosen to provide some symmetry to
the discovery scheme.1 33
Although the ABA Standards provide a somewhat comparable re-
quirement for the State,' 34 Allen's provision goes considerably beyond
128. Fritz v. State, 811 P.2d 1353, 1358 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
129. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 585 (1991).
130. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1176 (1991). This section contains no specific sanctions for failure to
comply with the notice provision. Since it is contained in a group of statutes concerned with the
determination of competency to stand trial, it seems arguable that the failure to give the required
notice has nothing to do with the introduction of evidence of mental illness or insanity at the trial
itself. Id
131. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
132. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
133. Id. at 1167.
134. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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what the ABA Standards require of the defense. The ABA Standards
only require the defense to disclose the names and addresses of witnesses
intended to be called with respect to an alibi or mental condition. Absent
is a requirement that any statements of those witnesses be disclosed.' 35
Although the ABA Standards do not require the disclosure of witness'
statements, a number of states do require such disclosures. 36
The ABA Standard requiring disclosure of defense witnesses on alibi
and mental condition specifically states that only those persons "the de-
fense intends to call as witnesses for testimony" need be disclosed.' It
has been suggested that the Allen court's failure to use similar language
indicates that this disclosure provision "extends to all witnesses regard-
less of whether the defense intends to call such witnesses at trial.' 138
However, it seems much more likely that the provision will only require
the disclosure of intended witnesses. As noted above, the language re-
quiring defense disclosure of witnesses is the same as that requiring pros-
ecution disclosure, which in turn comes from the ABA Standards.139
Although the ABA Standards themselves do not refer to the witnesses as
those intended to be called at trial, the commentary refers to such wit-
nesses as "prospective."'" Certainly the use of the word "prospective"
refers to the witness' status as a future trial witness rather than as simply
one who might have information about the case. In addition, any re-
quirement that the defendant disclose witnesses who will not be called at
trial is most likely unconstitutional since the Supreme Court's primary
rationale for upholding such defense disclosure requirements is the sim-
ple acceleration of time in which the defendant would be disclosing at
trial anyway. 141
2. Alibi Witnesses and Statements
The defense is also required to disclose the names and addresses of
135. ABA STANDARD 11-3.3.
136. See, eg., ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 15.2c(1); FLA. R. CR. P. 3.220(d)(2)(i); HAW. R. PEN. P.
16(c)(2)(i); ILL. Sup. CT. R. 413(d)(i); MASS. R. CR. P. 14 (a)(3); MINN. R. CR. P. 9.02(1)(3) NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-1916(1); N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3:13-3(b)(3); OHIO. R. CRIM. P. 16(d) (requiring disclo-
sure only after witness has testified on direct examination at trial); WASH. R. Sup. Cr. cRIM. P.
4.7(b)(1).
137. ABA STANDARD 11-3.3.
138. Uphoff, supra note 5, at 413.
139. ABA STANDARD 11-2.1(a)(i) (requiring the prosecution to disclose "the names and ad-
dresses of witnesses").
140. See ABA STANDARD 11-2.1(a)(i) cmt.
141. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85 (1970). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD
H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 863-67 (West 2d ed. 1992).
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alibi witnesses.142 This requirement is also based on the ABA Stan-
dards,143 but the ABA Standards do not require the disclosure of the
statements of any witnesses. 144
There is a difference between the general witness disclosure provi-
sion and the alibi witness disclosure provision. The general witness dis-
closure provision requires the disclosure of the witness' "relevant oral,
written or recorded statement, or summaries of same."' 45 In contrast,
the alibi provision only requires the disclosure of the witness' testimony
regarding the alibi. 14' Although this difference could be significant, it
seems more likely the difference in language was simply an oversight on
the part of the court. This seems likely because the general requirement
to disclose "oral, written or recorded statement(s)" would also seem to
apply to alibi witnesses. Since the court is trying to provide symmetry
between State and defense disclosures, it does not follow that the court
intended less disclosure of witness' statements for alibi witnesses than for
other types of witnesses. 47
It is also not clear whether the defense is actually required to give
notice of the intention to raise an alibi defense. The language of Allen
only requires the disclosure of possible alibi witnesses.148 Language that
would require disclosure of an alibi defense and the witnesses supporting
it is contained in title 22, section 585 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Section
585 refers in part to "notice of the intention of the defendant to claim
such alibi, which notice shall include specific information as to the place
at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged
offense ... ." However, section 585 only provides for a continuance of
the trial for the State to investigate the alibi if the defendant has not
given notice of the alibi defense. 149 Therefore, neither the current alibi
142. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
143. ABA STANDARD 11-3.3(a)(i).
144. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
145. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
146. Id.
147. Another possible interpretation is that the court intends for the defense to generate a state-
ment from the alibi witness specifically for the purpose of providing it to the prosecution. The use of
the phrase "statement to that fact" could imply such a requirement. This interpretation seems un-
likely, however, since one would expect that such a unique requirement of creating a statement solely
for the purpose of disclosure would be stated in less cryptic terms.
148. Although ABA Standard 11-3.3(a)(i) requires only the disclosure of alibi witnesses, not the
defense itself, the commentary to that section refers in several places to the disclosure of "contem-
plated defenses." The significance of such language may not be too great, however, since the ABA
Standards only require the disclosure of alibi and mental condition witnesses, and, thus, any disclo-
sure of witnesses is tantamount to a disclosure of the particular defense.
149. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 585 (1991).
[V/ol. 28:69
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statute nor the language of Allen specifically requires the defendant,
under the threat of any real sanction, to disclose the intention to raise an
alibi defense. 150
If the court did not intend to require such a disclosure, why did it
bother to include a specific section dealing with the disclosure of alibi
witnesses in addition to the general witness disclosure provision? One
possibility is that the court intends for the defense to separately list the
witnesses as alibi witnesses and, in effect, provide notice of the alibi de-
fense in that way. Alternatively, the court could be assuming that the
disclosure of the witness' statements will provide the State with the no-
tice of the alibi defense. In any event, the current language of Allen and
the alibi statute are likely to cause some confusion and will probably have
to be clarified. 1 '
3. Mental Condition Witnesses and Statements
In addition to alibi witnesses, the defense is required to disclose
the names and addresses of any witness the defendant will call, other
than himself, for testimony relating to any mental disease, mental de-
fect, or other condition bearing upon his mental state at the time the
offense was allegedly committed, together with the witness' statement
of that fact, if the statement is redacted by the court to preclude disclo-
sure of privileged communication.' 52
Although the ABA Standards require disclosure of mental condition wit-
nesses, 15 3 the standards do not require disclosure of any witness'
statements.
The language of this provision raises the same problem as the alibi
provision with respect to the nature of the witness' statement that must
be disclosed. The general witness disclosure provision requires disclosure
of the "oral, written or recorded statement(s)" of the witness, while this
provision only refers to the disclosure of the witness' "statement of that
fact." While it is certainly not clear, it seems most likely that the court
intended the same degree of disclosure for all types of witnesses and the
difference in language is simply an oversight.
As is the case with the alibi provision, the Allen decision does not
150. Connery v. State, 499 P.2d 462, 465 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
151. Another issue that the court will have to address is the court's authority to, in effect, alter
the application of the current alibi statute. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 585 (1991).
152. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
153. ABA STANDARD 11.3.3(a)(ii).
1992]
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make it clear whether the defense has to provide any notice of an inten-
tion to rely on mental condition at the trial or is just required to disclose
witnesses who will testify to such condition. Again, the existence of a
statutory provision probably creates confusion relating to this issue. Ti-
tle 22, section 1176 of the Oklahoma Statutes requires the defendant to
file an application with the court at least twenty days before trial "if the
defendant intends to raise the question of mental illness or insanity at the
time of the offense." Although that statute would seem to require the
disclosure of a mental condition defense, the rest of the statute is primar-
ily concerned with a procedure for determining whether the court should
provide an indigent defendant with the services of a qualified mental
health professional. In addition, the statute contains no specific sanc-
tions for failure to make the application, other than the implicit one that
an indigent who does not comply will not be provided with the appropri-
ate mental health services. Thus, the question of whether a defendant
must specifically disclose, under threat of sanction, a mental condition
defense remains unresolved.
The Allen court did not address the question of whether the sanc-
tions discussed in the decision may be applied to a defendant who fails to
provide notice of mental illness or insanity under title 22, section 1176 of
the Oklahoma Statutes. The Allen court did not expressly require that
notice be given. As with the alibi provision, the court may have intended
for the defense to specifically delineate only those witnesses who will tes-
tify to the defendant's mental condition, or the court may have intended
the required disclosure of such statements to, in effect, provide the notice
that such a defense will be raised.
This disclosure provision, unlike the others discussed above, con-
tains a specific provision that the statement be "redacted by the court to
preclude disclosure of privileged communication." '154 Although the fail-
ure to include such an admonition in the other provisions might lead to
the conclusion that privileged communications do not have to be re-
dacted from those statements, it is doubtful that the court intended such
a result.
In another section of the opinion, the Allen court specifically re-
quires the trial judge to "ensure that all discovery orders do not violate
the defendants' right against self-incrimination." '55 Although the phrase
"privileged communication" is certainly broader than the privilege
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against self-incrimination, it is clear that at least communications that
are privileged under the Fifth Amendment"5 6 should be redacted from all
witness statements, regardless of whether the specific provision contains
specific language about the redaction. Furthermore, the Oklahoma Evi-
dence Code provides a defendant with a number of confidential commu-
nication privileges,1"7 and the Allen decision does not suggest that such
privileges are to be abrogated in the name of discovery. Instead, it ap-
pears that the court made specific reference to the redaction of privileged
communications in the context of mental condition witness statements
simply because those are the statements most likely to include privileged
communications.
4. Documents and Tangible Objects
In addition to the disclosure of witnesses and their statements, the
defendant is also required, upon request of the prosecuting attorney, to
allow access "at any reasonable times and in any reasonable manner to
inspect, photograph, copy, or have reasonable tests made upon any book,
paper, document, photograph, or tangible object which is within the de-
fendant's possession or control." ' 8 This particular provision was not
taken from the ABA Standards,'59 but from the Federal Rules"6 and the
Uniform Rules. 6' The Uniform Rules and the Federal Rules, however,
156. The privilege against self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." U.S. CONST. art. V.
157. The confidential communication privileges contained in the Oklahoma Evidence Code are
the Attorney-Client Privilege; the Physician and Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege; the Husband-
Wife Privilege; and the Religious Privilege. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2502-2505 (1991).
158. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
159. There is no comparable ABA standard. The only similar disclosure required of the ABA
Standards is the disclosure of medical and scientific reports that the defense intends to use at a
hearing or trial. ABA STANDARD 11-3.2.
160. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A). Section 16(b)(1)(A) provides:
If the defendant requests disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (D) of this rule, upon
compliance with such request by the government, the defendant, on request of the govern-
ment, shall permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, docu-
ments, photographs, tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the
possession, custody, or control of the defendant and which the defendant intends to intro-
duce as evidence in chief at the trial.
Id.
161. UNIFORM RULES 423(i) (Supp. 1987). Rule 423(i) provides:
If the defendant has requested and received discovery under Rule 421 or 422(b), the de-
fendant, upon the prosecuting attorney's written request after the time set under Rule 411,
shall allow the prosecuting attorney access at any reasonable time and in any reasonable
manner to inspect, photograph, copy, or have reasonable tests made upon any book, paper,
document, recording, photograph, or other tangible object within the defendant's posses-
sion or control which the defendant intends to offer in evidence.
1992]
25
Blair: Oklahoma Criminal Discovery after Allen
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1992
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:69
make the defendant's duty to disclose such information contingent on the
defendant having at least requested similar information from the State.
The Allen decision appears to require the defendant to allow access to
such information, regardless of whether the defendant has sought such
information from the State.
The Allen decision follows the Federal Rules and the Uniform Rules
which only require the defendant to allow access to such items the de-
fendant intends to offer in evidence. 62 Similarly, Allen includes an ex-
ception which also appears in the Federal Rules163 and the Uniform
Rules."' Allen requires the defendant to allow the State access to "a
report or statement as to a physical or mental examination or scientific
test or experiment made in connection with the particular case prepared
by and relating to the anticipated testimony of a person whom the de-
fendant intends to call as a witness." 165 Thus, as long as such a report or
statement is prepared by and relates to the testimony of an intended wit-
ness, access is required regardless of whether the report or statements
themselves are intended to be offered in evidence. This provision there-
fore makes such reports or statements available for cross examination in
the same way that Allen makes witness statements available under the
witness' statement disclosure provisions.1 66
Note that except for the word "recording," the rest of this provision is essentially the same as Rule
16(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Ma
162. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
163. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B). Rule 16(b)(1)(B) provides:
If the defendant requests disclosure under subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (D) of this rule, upon
compliance with such request by the government, the defendant, on request of the govern-
ment, shall permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph any results or re-
ports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in
connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control of
the defendant, which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief at trial or
which were prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the
results or reports relate to that witness' testimony.
Id
164. UNIFORM RULES 423(g) (Supp. 1987). Rule 423(g) provides:
If the defendant has requested and received discovery under Rule 421 or Rule 422(b), the
defendant, upon the prosecuting attorney's written request after the time set under Rule
411, shall furnish the prosecuting attorney a copy of any report or statement regarding a
medical examination or scientific test, experiment, or comparison if the report or
statement;
(1) was made in connection with the particular case;
(2) was prepared by an expert whom the defendant intends to call as a witness at hearing
or trial; and
(3) relates to the witness' anticipated testimony.
Id
165. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
166. See supra notes 132-141 and accompanying text.
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Although these provisions generally follow the scheme of the Fed-
eral Rules and the Uniform Rules, Allen makes explicit what is implicit
in those rules. The Allen decision specifically excludes from disclosure
any document "to the extent that it contains any communication of the
defendant." '167 In addition, any reports or statements relating to physical
or mental examination, scientific tests, or experiments must be "redacted
by the court to preclude disclosure of privileged communication."' 68
This use of different language indicates another possible area of ambigu-
ity the court of criminal appeals may have to clarify. The language
makes it clear some reports must still be disclosed so long as redaction of
privileged communications occurs. However, it could be argued that any
item containing communication of the defendant is completely immune
from disclosure, even if such communication could be redacted.
V. REGULATION OF DIsCOvERY
A. Use of Disclosed Information
The Allen decision does not restrict the defendant's use of informa-
tion disclosed by the State. However, Allen significantly limits the State's
use of information disclosed by the defendant.
With respect to the various statements disclosed to the State, the
Allen decision provides such statements are "not admissible in evidence
at trial."' 69 The decision further provides that information obtained as a
result of the filing of such a statement is likewise not admissible in evi-
dence at trial "except to refute the testimony of a witness" whose identity
was required to be disclosed. 7 ' This limitation is taken from the ABA
Standards.'' The commentary to the ABA Standards states that the
"provision has been added to ensure that the defendant who chooses not
to call the named witness will not be penalized for changing strategy.' 7 2
The Allen decision seems to make a conscious distinction between
the use of a witness' statement and the use of "information obtained as a




171. ABA STANDARD 11-3.3(b). Standard 11-3.3(b) provides:
(b) Information disclosed pursuant to paragraph (a) is not admissible in evidence at a
hearing or trial. Information obtained as a result of disclosures made pursuant to para-
graph (a) is not admissible in evidence except to refute the testimony of a witness whose
identity is required to be disclosed pursuant to paragraph (a).
Id.
172. ABA STANDARD 11-3.3(b) cmt.
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result of the filing of such a statement." In the event a defense witness
testifies inconsistently with the disclosed statement, the State would ap-
parently be permitted to cross examine the witness about such inconsis-
tencies based on the "information obtained as a result of the filing of such
a statement." If, however, the witness denies making the prior inconsis-
tent statement, it appears that the disclosed statement itself would "not
[be] admissible in evidence at trial" to refute the witness' denial; 173
whereas "[i]nformation obtained as result of the filing of such a state-
ment" apparently could be.
The Allen decision places a similar restriction on the use of informa-
tion disclosed with respect to documents, reports, and tangible objects.
In similar language, the decision holds that information obtained as a
result of the disclosure of such information is not admissible in evidence
at trial except to refute the matter disclosed.174
The Allen decision also provides that "the fact that the defendant
. . . has indicated an intent to offer a matter in evidence or to call a
person as a witness is not admissible in evidence at trial. ' 175 This other-
wise straightforward limitation is ambiguous because of where it is
placed in the opinion. The defense disclosure provisions are contained in
two subdivisions. Subdivision 1(a), (b), and (c) regulate disclosure of wit-
nesses and witness' statements. Subdivision 2(a) and (b) regulate disclo-
sure of documents, reports, and tangible objects. At the end of each of
these subdivisions, language appears referring to "this subdivision." The
prohibition against using the defendant's intention to call a witness at
trial appears after subdivision 2(b) in a sentence referring to disclosures
made under "this subdivision." Since the subdivision requiring the dis-
closure of witnesses does not contain such a prohibition, one could argue
the State is not prohibited from offering into evidence a defendant's dis-
closed intention to call a person as a witness under that section.
Although a literal reading of Allen might support this interpreta-
tion, it seems doubtful that the court intended such a result. First, subdi-
vision 2 does not require the disclosure of the defendant's intention to
173. Under the Oklahoma Evidence Code, it would otherwise be permissible for the prosecutor
to introduce extrinsic evidence of the witness' prior inconsistent statement. OKLA. STAT. tit, 12,
§ 2613 (1991). Allen simply seems to prevent the prosecutor from using the statement itself as the
extrinsic evidence.
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call any witnesses. Subdivision 1 requires that disclosure. Thus, the lan-
guage in subdivision 2 referring to the defendant's intention to call a wit-
ness would be useless unless it was meant as a limitation on the use of
information obtained pursuant to subdivision 1. Second, the language
the court uses to limit the use of a defendant's disclosure is substantially
similar to the Uniforn Rules, which apply to all of the defendant's dis-
closures, not just those in certain subdivisions.17 6 Thus, despite the un-
fortunate wording of some of the opinion, it seems fairly clear the court
intended to limit the State's use of all disclosed information to refuting
the matter disclosed and did not intend to allow the State to use it in any
affirmative manner.
B. Protection of Privileged Material
The Allen decision does not envision trial judges issuing generic or-
ders to defendants requiring them to disclose everything listed in the or-
der. Rather, the decision requires close scrutiny of the material that
might be required to be disclosed to ensure protection of privileged
information.
As noted above,17 7 the Allen decision emphasizes in several places
the importance of preventing disclosure of privileged information. Any
statements of intended mental condition witnesses must be "redacted by
the court to preclude disclosure of privileged communication."'17 8 In ad-
dition, any reports or statements as to any physical or mental examina-
tion, or scientific test or experiment must be similarly redacted. 1 9
Most importantly, the decision requires that "the trial judge shall
ensure all discovery orders do not violate the defendants' right against
self-incrimination."' 180 In another section of the decision, the court notes
that the State may have access to various papers and documents the de-
fendant intends to introduce at trial "except to the extent that [they]
176. UNIFORM RULES 423(1) (Supp. 1987). Rule 423(1) provides:
The fact that the defendant, under this Rule, has indicated an intention to offer specified
evidence or to call a designated witness is not admissible in evidence at a hearing or trial.
Evidence obtained as a result of disclosure under this Rule is not admissible at trial except
to refute:
(1) the evidence disclosed if the defendant introduces it; or
(2) the testimony of a witness whose identity this Rule requires to be disclosed.
Id.
177. See supra notes 154-167 and accompanying text.
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contain any communication of the defendant."181 Thus, although the Al-
len decision requires significantly increased disclosures on the part of the
defendant, the decision does not stand as an invitation to the trial courts
to abrogate the defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. 182 In guarding against any such violations, the trial courts must
be careful not to enforce blanket discovery orders without first determin-
ing, on a case by case basis, the impact on the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination.
C. Continuing Duty to Disclose
The ABA Standards,'83 the Uniform Rules,'" and the Federal
Rules 8' all provide for a continuing duty to disclose otherwise discovera-
ble material even if it is not discovered until after other required disclo-
sures have been made. The Allen decision does not contain such a
general provision, but instead has just one specific reference to a continu-
ing duty to disclose which only applies to the disclosure of documents,
reports, and tangible objects by the defendant. That section provides
that "if the defendant subsequently ascertains that he has possession or
181. Id.
182. The Allen decision has been challenged as violating the defendants' privilege against self-
incrimination. See Uphoff, supra note 138, at 387. Although there is certainly the potential for
violations in individual cases, it should be noted that in states which have similar witness statement
disclosure provisions, self-incrimination objections to such required disclosures have generally been
rejected in light of two Supreme Court decisions. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 522-24 (West. 1984). Any further analysis of the privilege against self-in-
crimination is beyond the scope of this article.
183. ABA STANDARD 11-4.2. Standard 11-4.2 provides:
If, subsequent to compliance with these standards or orders pursuant thereto, a party dis-
covers additional material or information which is subject to disclosure, the other party
shall promptly be notified of the existence of such additional material. If the additional
material or information is discovered during or after trial, the court shall also be notified.
Id
184. UNIFORM RuLES 421(c) (Supp. 1987). Rule 421(c) provides: "If any matter relating to the
case, other than legal work product specified in subdivision (b)(1), comes within the prosecuting
attorney's possession or control after the defendant has had access under this Rule, the prosecuting
attorney shall promptly inform the defendant." Id; UNIFORM RULES 423(j) (Supp. 1987). Rule
423(j) provides: "If the defendant discovers a matter specified in this Rule after the time set by Rule
11: (1) the defendant shall promptly furnish it to the prosecuting attorney; and (2) the court, on
motion of the prosebuting attorney, may grant additional time, a continuance, or other appropriate
relief." Id
185. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(c). Rule 16(c) provides:
If, prior to or during trial, a party discovers additional evidence or material previously
requested or ordered, which is subject to discovery or inspection under this rule, such party
shall promptly notify the other party or that other party's attorney or the court of the
existence of the additional evidence or material.
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control of such a matter, he shall promptly so inform the prosecuting
attorney." 18 6 Despite the fact that the Allen decision does not contain
any other general provision requiring a continuing duty to disclose, it
would appear that both the prosecutor and defendant are still under a
continuing duty to disclose required information regardless of when it is
discovered.
In the language used to describe the information required to be dis-
closed by both the State and defendant, no language exists indicating
either party is only required to disclose information discovered at a par-
ticular time. Rather, the language is quite broad in simply requiring the
parties to disclose certain information. The only real timing restriction
comes in the section of the opinion dealing with when discovery should
be provided. That section requires that "all issues relating to discovery
will be completed at least ten days (10) prior to trial."'18 7 This language
simply addresses the obvious necessity that pretrial discovery must end
sometime before the trial starts. It does not mean that anything discov-
ered after that time is therefore immune from disclosure. Such an inter-
pretation would defeat the purpose behind requiring pretrial discovery by
encouraging delays in the discovery of information until after the time it
has to be disclosed.
Any ambiguity that might exist because of the lack of a general pro-
vision requiring a continuing duty to disclose can be resolved in the dis-
covery order issued to both parties by the trial judge. TheAllen decision
specifically suggests the "judge should enter a written order setting forth
discovery, inspection and copying requirements for each party and a time
for compliance." '188
D. Work Product Exception
The Allen decision specifically provides that "the discovery order
shall not include discovery of legal work product of either attorney
which is deemed to include legal research or those portions of records,
correspondence, reports, or memoranda which are only the opinions,
186. This language follows section 2(a) and (b), which generally refers to the disclosure by the
defendant of documents, reports, and tangible objects. Thus, the phrase "such a matter" likely refers
to all of the items mentioned in that section. However, the language immediately follows the part of
section two that refers to reports or statements relating to physical or mental examinations or scien-
tific tests and experiments. Thus, it might be possible, although not probable, that "such a matter"
refers only to these more limited items from section two. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
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theories, or conclusions of the attorney or the attorney's legal staff." ' 9
The ABA Standards,1"' the Uniform Rules,191 and the Federal Rules1 92
contain exclusions for what is essentially the same type of information.
The court previously adopted the work product exception contained
in the ABA Standards.1 93 Even prior to that adoption, the court recog-
nized a work product privilege.1 94 It appears, however, that the applica-
tion of the exception may be different under Allen. For example, the
court previously held that work product included reports compiled by a
189. Id. at 1169.
190. ABA STANDARD 11-2.6(a). Standard 11-2.6(a) provides: "Disclosure shall not be required
of legal research or of records, correspondence, reports, or memoranda to the extent that they con-
tain the opinions, theories, or conclusions of the prosecuting attorney or members of the prosecutor's
legal staff." Id.; ABA STANDARD 11-3.2(b). Standard 11-3.2(b) provides: "Disclosure shall not be
required: (i) of legal research or of records, correspondence, reports, or memoranda to the extent
that they contain the opinions, theories, or conclusions of the defense attorney or members of the
defense legal staff, or (i) of any communications of the defendant. Id.
191. UNIroRM RULES 421(b)(1) (Supp. 1987). Rule 421(b)(1) provides:
The prosecuting attorney need not allow access to portions of records, correspondence,
reports, recordings, or memoranda to the extent that they are:
(i) legal research; or (ii) opinions, theories, or conclusions of the prosecuting attorney, a
member of the prosecuting attorney's staff, or an agent of the prosecuting attorney not
intended to be called as a witness.
Id
Rule 403(k)(1) provides:
The defendant need not furnish any portion of a report, statement, or recording to the
extent it is:
(i) legal research;
(ii) an opinion, theory, or conclusion of the defendant's lawyer, a member of the lawyer's
staff, or an agent of the lawyer not intended to be called as a witness; or
(iii) a communication of the defendant.
UNIFORM RULES 423(k)(1) (Supp. 1987).
192. FED. IL CRIM. P. 16(a)(2), (b)(2). Rule 16(a)(2) provides:
Except as provided in paragraphs (A),(B), and (D) of subdivision (a)(1), this rule does not
authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government
documents made by the attorney for the government or other government agents in con-
nection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by govern-




Except as to scientific or medical reports, this subdivision does not authorize the discovery
or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal defense documents made by the
defendant, or the defendant's attorneys or agents in connection with the investigation or
defense of the case, or of statements made by the defendant, or by government or defense
witnesses, or by prospective government or defense witnesses, to the defendant, the defend-
ant's agents or attorneys.
Id.
193. Moore v. State, 740 P.2d 731, 736 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).
194. Nauni v. State, 670 P.2d 126, 133 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Perez v. State, 614 P.2d 1112,
1115 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); State ex rel. Fallis v. Truesdell, 493 P.2d 1134, 1135-37 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1972).
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law enforcement agency in the course of its investigation1 95 and unsworn
witness statements obtained by the prosecuting attorney and police of-
ficers.196 In the case where the court previously adopted the ABA Stan-
dards, the court emphasized that in order to qualify as work product the
paper or document must have been prepared by the prosecuting attorney
or a member of the legal staff, this seems to exclude reports prepared by
law enforcement agencies.' 97 In a post-Allen decision, the court seems to
have backed off of the blanket exclusion of law enforcement reports by
holding that the trial court should not summarily overrule a discovery
request for such law enforcement reports (such as those of the OSBI), but
should determine from a review of the reports whether they are relevant
and discoverable.1 98 In Allen, the court eliminated the work product
protection for unsworn statements by requiring disclosure of the names
and addresses of witnesses "together with their relevant oral, written or
recorded statement, or summaries of same."' 199
E. Protective Orders
The ABA Standards,2" the Uniform Rules,20 1 and the Federal
195. State ex rel Fals, 493 P.2d at 1136.
196. Id. at 1135-38; Nauni v. State, 670 P.2d 126, 133 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Ray v. State,
510 P.2d 1395, 1398-99 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Shapard v. State, 437 P.2d 565, 593-94 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1967).
197. Moore, 740 P.2d at 736.
198. Amos v. District Court of Mayes County, 814 P.2d 502, 503 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
199. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
200. ABA STANDARD 11-4.4. Standard 11-4.4 provides:
Upon a showing of cause, the court may at any time order that specified disclosures be
restricted, conditioned upon compliance with protective measures, or deferred, or make
such other order as is appropriate, provided that all material and information to which a
party is entitled is disclosed in time to permit counsel to make beneficial use of the
disclosure.
Id.
201. UNIFORM RuLEs 421 (b)(3) (Supp. 1987). Rule 421(b)(3) provides:
(i) The court may permit the prosecuting attorney to defer access for a specified time to
the extent earlier access would create a substantial risk to any person of physical harm,
intimidation, or bribery or to the extent justified by the need to protect the integrity of a
continuing investigation. Deferral may not be permitted if it prejudices a right of the de-
fendant or allows insufficient time before trial for the defendant to make beneficial use of
the information sought, including any additional pretrial discovery thereby necessitated.
(ii) The court may impose reasonable conditions as to manner of inspection, photograph-
ing, copying, or testing, to the extent necessary to protect the evidentiary value of any
matter to which the defendant seeks access or the prosecuting attorney proposes to test.
Id.
UNIFORM RULE 423(k)(3) (Supp. 1987). Rule 423(k)(3) provides:
Upon a showing of good cause, the court may order that the furnishing of a report, state-
ment, document, recording, or object may be denied, restricted, or deferred for a specified
time. The court may order the defendant to disclose promptly to the prosecuting attorney a
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Rules20 2 specifically authorize courts to issue protective orders regulating
the timing and disclosure of discoverable information. However, Allen
does not specifically mention protective orders. Despite the failure of the
court to specifically authorize such orders, it would appear trial courts in
Oklahoma are still authorized to issue them. The decision clearly implies
that trial courts play a regulatory role in the discovery process by specifi-
cally requiring trial courts to redact privileged communications 03 and
ensure that all discovery orders do not violate the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination. 2" In addition, trial courts possessed the au-
thority to so regulate discovery even prior to the Allen decision, and
nothing in the decision suggests that they do not retain that authority.20 5
F. Sanctions
The Allen decision lists separate sanctions which may be imposed on
the State and/or defense for failure to comply with a discovery order.
One section common to both prosecution and defense sanctions, how-
ever, prohibits "either party from introducing specified evidence or call-
ing a specified witness." 2" The decision states that such sanction
"relates to items or persons required to be disclosed by the court's dis-
covery order"2 "7 and requires the "party against whom the sanction is
sought.., to comply with the order or show good cause as to why the
party failed to comply."20 It would appear the inclusion of such lan-
guage ensures that the severe sanction of exclusion of evidence is reserved
list of the sources of information relied upon in any report the furnishing of which has been
denied, restricted, or deferred.
Id.
202. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1). Rule 16(d)(1) provides:
Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that the discovery or inspection
be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion
by a party, the court may permit the party to make such a showing, in whole or in part, in
the form of a written statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an
order granting relief following such an ex paste showing, the entire text of the party's
statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to
the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
IdL
203. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168; see supra notes 177-182 and accompanying text.
204. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
205. For example, in Moore v. State, 740 P.2d 731 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), the court of crimi-
nal appeals held that the defendant was entitled to have an expert examine and test the samples of an
alleged illegal substance that were actually examined by the State's experts. The court then stated
that such a rule does not "forbid the trial court from placing conditions on the examination designed
to adequately safeguard the integrity of the evidence." Id. at 735.
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for willful violations of discovery orders. °9
One problem created by the language used in the two sections on
sanctions is determining what constitutes a violation warranting the im-
position of sanctions. The sections themselves refer to a failure "to com-
ply with the discovery order. '210 That language would seem to indicate
that an actual discovery order is a prerequisite to the imposition of sanc-
tions. However, the sections of the decision that relate to the disclosures
simply state that the prosecution and the defense "shall" make certain
disclosures or "shall" allow access to certain items. That language would
seem to indicate a requirement to make such disclosures even in the ab-
sence of an order. In fact, the Federal Rules,2" the ABA Standards,212
and the Uniform Rules213 are designed to operate without obtaining a
discovery order. In another section of the decision, however, the court
indicates that "the judge should enter a written order setting forth dis-
covery, inspection and copying requirements for each party. '214 Any
ambiguity about the necessity of having a discovery order can obviously
be resolved by obtaining such an order from the trial court.
The possibility of imposing sanctions directly on the attorneys is not
specifically addressed in Allen. The ABA Standards expressly authorize
the imposition of such sanctions."1 In addition to the specifically men-
tioned sanctions discussed below, trial courts, under Allen, have the au-
thority to "grant appropriate relief"' 216  which might include the
imposition of sanctions on the attorneys. The comment to the Uniform
Rules indicates that sanctions against counsel might be "other appropri-
ate relief" even though such a sanction is not specifically mentioned in
the Uniform Rules."1 7
209. Such exclusion sanctions have not generally been favored by the ABA Standards and the
Unifonn Rules. See infra notes 228-234 and accompanying text. Although the Supreme Court has
approved of the sanction of the exclusion of defense evidence, the willfulness of the violation is an
important factor in determining the appropriateness of such a sanction. Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S.
Ct. 1743, 1747-48 (1991); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409-16 (1988).
210. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1169.
211. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2) (indicating that it is the rule and not an order that triggers the
obligation to make the required disclosures).
212. ABA STANDARD 11-4.7 (implying that the rules are, in effect, self executing).
213. UNIFORM RULES 421(e), 422(d), 423(m) (Supp. 1987) (indicating that an "order" is not
necessary to the imposition of discovery sanctions).
214. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
215. ABA STANDARD 11-4.7.(b) (providing that "the court may subject counsel to appropriate
sanctions upon a finding that counsel willfully violated the rule or order").
216. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1169.
217. UNIFORM RULES 423(m) cmt. (Supp. 1987).
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1. Against the Prosecution
In addition to specifying the information subject to pretrial disclo-
sure, the Allen decision specifies the sanctions that may be imposed on
the State for noncompliance with a discovery order. Trial courts are em-
powered to grant "appropriate relief, which may include one or more of
the following: "[R]equiring the prosecuting attorney to comply, granting
the defendant additional time or a continuance, relieving the defendant
from making a disclosure required by court pursuant to these rules,
prohibiting the prosecuting attorney from introducing specified evidence
or calling specified witnesses, and dismissing charges. ' 218 This language
is taken directly from the 1974 version of the Uniforn Rules.219 How-
ever, the list of possible sanctions in the 1987 version is not as exhaustive.
For instance, the 1987 version does not specifically mention the following
sanctions: relieving the defendant from making a disclosure, excluding
the State's evidence, or granting a mistrial. Those provisions are simply
replaced with a provision that the court may "grant other appropriate
relief."220
Although the ABA Standards also generally allow the trial court to
grant appropriate relief,221 the actual list of what might be appropriate in
218. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1169.
219. UNiFoRM RULES 421(e), 422(c) (1976). Both provide:
If the prosecuting attorney fails to comply with this Rule, the court on motion of the
defendant or on its own motion shall grant appropriate relief, which may include one or
more of the following: requiring the prosecuting attorney to comply, granting the defend-
ant additional time or a continuance, relieving the defendant from making a disclosure
required by Rule 423, prohibiting the prosecuting attorney from introducing specified evi-
dence, and dismissing charges.
Id
220. UNIFORM RULES 421(e), 422(d) (Supp. 1987). Both provide:
If the prosecuting attorney fails to comply with this Rule, the court, on motion of the
defendant or its own motion, shall require the prosecuting attorney to comply, grant the
defendant additional time or a continuance, grant a mistrial, or grant other appropriate
relief.
Id
The comment to these rules does not mention what significance, if any, should be attached to
the fact that the 1987 version no longer specifically mentions exclusion of evidence or excusing the
defendant from making a disclosure. The comment to Rule 423(m), which deals with sanctions for
defense noncompliance, states that "although this subdivision does not specifically rule out exclusion
of evidence as a sanction, neither does it list it and it generally would be inappropriate." UNIFORM
RULES 423(m) (Supp. 1987). Whether it would also generally be inappropriate to exclude the prose-
cuting attorney's evidence is not clear.
221. ABA STANDARD 11-4.7. Standard 11-4.7 provides:
If an applicable discovery rule or an order issued pursuant thereto is not promptly
implemented:
(a) the court may:
(i) order the noncomplying party to permit the discovery of the material and information
not previously disclosed;
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Allen goes considerably beyond the ABA Standards. The commentary to
the sanctions provision of the ABA Standards specifically states that "the
general authority to enter an appropriate order is not intended to endorse
sanctions that punish nondisclosure of one party by canceling the other
party's duty to disclose, or that exclude from evidence any discoverable,
but nondisclosed, items. 222 The Federal Rules provide for the exclusion
of evidence, 223 but do not specifically allow for relieving the other party
from making a disclosure; however, the court is authorized to "enter
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances."'224
2. Against the Defense
The Allen decision also outlines the sanctions potentially applicable
to defendants who fail to comply with discovery orders. The section pro-
vides that the court, on motion of the prosecuting attorney or on its own
motion, "shall grant appropriate relief, which may include one or more
of the following: "[R]equiring the defendant to comply, granting the
prosecuting attorney additional time or a continuance, prohibiting the
defendant from introducing specified evidence or calling specified wit-
nesses, and granting a mistrial based on manifest necessity due to the acts
of the defendant. '225 This language is generally based on the Uniform
Rules. 226 The Uniform Rules, however, do not contain the provision al-
lowing the exclusion of the defendant's evidence or witnesses. The lan-
guage of the Allen decision stating that the mistrial must be based on
manifest necessity is also not in the Uniform Rules.2 27
(ii) grant a continuance; or
(iii) enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances; or
(b) the court may subject counsel to appropriate sanctions upon a finding that counsel
willfully violated the rule or order.
Id.
222. ABA STANDARD 11-4.7(a) cmt.
223. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2). Rule 16(d)(2) provides:
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to
permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from intro-
ducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the
circumstances. The court may specify the time, place and manner of making the discovery
and inspection and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
Id.
224. Id.
225. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1169.
226. UNIFORM RULES 423(m) (Supp. 1987). Rule 423(m) provides: "If the defendant fails to
comply with this Rule, the court, on motion of the prosecuting attorney or its own motion, shall
require the defendant to comply, grant the prosecuting attorney additional time or a continuance,
grant a mistrial, or grant other appropriate relief." Id.
227. It would appear that the "manifest necessity" language was added because of the double
19921
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Both the Uniform Rules and the ABA Standards specifically reject
the sanction of excluding the defendant's evidence. The commentary to
both the Uniform Rules and the ABA Standards states that the "exclu-
sion sanction is not recommended because its results are capricious.
[E]xclusion of defense evidence may lead to an unfair conviction [which]
would defeat the objectives of discovery."228 The Uniform Rules and the
ABA Standards also reject the exclusion of defense evidence because it
"raises significant constitutional issues' 229 which have since been essen-
tially resolved.23
Sanctions applicable to defendants do not include excusing the pros-
ecuting attorney from making a required disclosure. As indicated above,
that is a sanction that can be imposed for the State's failure to comply.
231
Although the court does have the authority to "grant appropriate relief,"
the specific exclusion of this sanction from the defense section when it
was included in the prosecution section indicates that it is not an appro-
priate sanction. Neither the ABA Standards2 32 nor the Uniform Rules233
approve of the sanction of relieving the prosecuting attorney from mak-
ing an otherwise required disclosure.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS DISCOVERY PROVISIONS
The Allen decision clearly dominates the field of pretrial criminal
discovery in Oklahoma. However, there are a few other statutory and
case law provisions that serve the same function of providing pretrial
information in a criminal case.
jeopardy prohibition against retrying a defendant following a mistrial, unless the mistrial was
granted because of a "manifest necessity." See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505-06 (1978);
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971); LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 141, at 1065-73
(discussing mistrials and manifest necessity).
228. UNIFORM RULES 423(m) cmt. (Supp. 1987) (quoting from commentary to ABA Standard
11-4.7).
229. Id.
230. In Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
exclusion sanction constituted a per se violation of the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to com-
pulsory process. Id. at 402. The Court held that where the defendants' failure to comply with a
discovery requirement "was willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that
would minimize the effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal testimony,
it would be entirely consistent with the purposes of the Compulsory Process Clause simply to ex-
clude the witness' testimony." Id. at 415.
231. See supra notes 218-224 and accompanying text.
232. ABA STANDARD 11-4.7 cmt.
233. UNIFORM RULES 423(c) cmt. (Supp. 1987).
[Vol. 28:69
38
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 28 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss1/3
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY AFTER ALLEN
A. Depositions
Although depositions are commonplace in civil litigation, 3 4 their
use in criminal cases is much more limited. Only about ten states allow
depositions to be used as a basic discovery device.23 5 Most states, includ-
ing Oklahoma, only allow the use of depositions in criminal cases as a
method of preserving the testimony of a witness who is likely to be un-
available at trial.23 6
Oklahoma statutes provide two separate procedures for taking a wit-
ness' deposition in a criminal prosecution. Title 22, sections 761-771 of
the Oklahoma Statutes govern the taking of depositions of in-state wit-
nesses. Section 762 provides that such depositions may be taken "[w]hen
a material witness in any criminal case is about to leave the state, or is so
sick or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for apprehending that he
will be able to attend the trial. . . ." Although both the State and the
defendant may apply for an order to take the deposition of an in-state
witness,23 7 only the defendant can apply for an order to take the deposi-
tion of an out-of-state witness pursuant to title 22, sections 781-783.
Although the deposition may be read into evidence if the witness is un-
able to attend the trial,23 8 potential unavailability is not a prerequisite to
taking the deposition.23 9
B. District Attorney Subpoenas
In addition to the two deposition procedures mentioned above, title
22, section 258 of the Oklahoma Statutes allows district attorneys to ob-
tain subpoenas in felony cases to depose witnesses. However, this proce-
dure cannot be used for investigative purposes where charges have not
been filed.?4
C. Notice of Intention to Use Evidence
1. Other Crimes Evidence
The Oklahoma Evidence Code provides, as did the common law, for
the admission of evidence of crimes other than those charged to prove
234. See OKLA. STAT. tit 12, §§ 3201-3237 (1991).
235. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 141, at 845.
236. Id.
237. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 762 (1991).
238. Id. § 793.
239. Id. § 783.
240. Isaacs v. District Court of Okla. County, 818 P.2d 1247, 1249-50 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
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motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, ab-
sence of mistake, or accident. 241 Because of its concern with the number
of cases in which error was committed through the introduction of such
other crimes evidence, the court, in Burks v. State, 242 established proce-
dures to be followed whenever the State seeks to introduce other crimes
evidence. The court also held that notice is required when the State seeks
to introduce evidence of other acts of the defendant that do not consti-
tute crimes. 243
These procedures require the State, within ten days before trial or at
a pretrial hearing, whichever occurs first, to furnish the defendant with a
written statement of the other offenses or acts it intends to prove, de-
scribed with the same particularity required of an indictment or informa-
tion.24  This notice requirement is designed, at least in part, to provide
the defendant an opportunity to obtain a pretrial determination on the
admissibility of such evidence through the filing of a motion in limine.
Under certain circumstances, failure to give proper notice of an un-
charged crime that is proved at trial may bar any future prosecution for
that crime.245
The requirement of pretrial notice is not applicable to the evidence
of other crimes sought to be admitted on rebuttal, but in such event, the
trial court should conduct an in camera hearing to determine the admis-
sibility of the evidence. 2" Likewise, Burks notice is not required with
respect to other offenses which are actually a part of the res gestae of the
crime charged.247 Regardless of whether notice is required, the trial
court must give a limiting instruction with respect to the other crimes
evidence if requested by the defendant. 24
241. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2404(B) (1991).
242. 594 P.2d 771 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
243. Coates v. State, 773 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); Freeman v. State, 767 P.2d
1354, 1357 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
244. Burks v. State, 594 P.2d 771, 774 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
245. Hainey v. State, 740 P.2d 146, 152 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); Byrne v. State, 620 P.2d 1328,
1334 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981).
246. Burks, 594 P.2d at 775.
247. Id at 774; Williams v. State, 754 P.2d 555, 556 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Parsons v. State,
740 P.2d 167, 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); Bolton v. State, 702 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Okla. Crim. App.
1985); Caffey v. State, 661 P.2d 897, 901 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
248. See Jones v. State, 772 P.2d 922 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (overruling Landtroop v. State,
753 P.2d 1371 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) and Burks v. State, 594 P.2d 771 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979)
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2. Statements of Children with Respect to Physical Abuse or
Sexual Contact
In criminal and juvenile proceedings, the Oklahoma Evidence Code
provides for the admission of certain statements made by a child twelve
years of age or younger which describe any act of physical abuse against
the child or any act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by
another.249 The court must find that the time, content, and circum-
stances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability.25° In or-
der to provide the adverse party with an opportunity to prepare an
answer to such a statement, the proponent must notify the adverse party
of his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement
at least ten days in advance of the proceedings.25 ' Failure to provide
such notice is fundamental error,25 2 although constructive notice may be
sufficient.25 3
3. Hearsay "Catchall" Exceptions
The Oklahoma Evidence Code provides two "catchall" exceptions to
the hearsay rule under which statements not specifically covered by any
other exception might be admitted if sufficiently trustworthy.25 4 In order
to allow the adverse party a fair opportunity to prepare to meet such
statements, both provisions require the proponent to give notice to the
adverse party of her intention to offer the statement and the particulars
of the statement, including the name and address of the declarant.
4. The Best Evidence Rule
The best evidence rule requires that the original be used to prove the
contents of a writing, recording, or photograph except as otherwise pro-
vided.255 One situation in which the original is not required and other
evidence of the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph is admis-
sible is when the original is under the control of the party against whom
it is offered, and that party does not produce the original at the hear-
ing.256 In order to take advantage of this provision, however, the party
249. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (1991). This provision has been held constitutional. Jones,
781 P.2d at 328.
250. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2803.1(A)(1) (1991).
251. Id. § 2803.1(B).
252. Spears v. State, 805 P.2d 681, 682-83 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
253. Id.; In re W.D., 709 P.2d 1037, 1043 (Okla. 1985).
254. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 2803(24), 2804(B)(5) (1991).
255. Id. § 3002.
256. Id. § 3004(3).
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against whom the evidence is offered must have been put on notice by the
pleadings or otherwise, that the contents of the original would be a sub-
ject of proof at the hearing.257
D. Preliminary Examination
The defendant has a right to a preliminary examination pursuant to
article II, section 17 of the Oklahoma Constitution."' Although the
traditional purpose of the preliminary examination is to determine
"(1) whether the crime charged has been committed and (2) whether
there is probable cause to believe the accused committed it,"259 the court
of criminal appeals has also specifically held that another purpose of the
preliminary examination is to provide discovery for the defendant." As
a result, the court has required the defendant be given wide latitude in
cross-examination of the State's witnesses and in obtaining relevant ex-
culpatory evidence. 261 Because of the lack of pretrial discovery prior to
the Allen decision, defense attorneys necessarily utilized the preliminary
examination as their primary discovery device.262 As a result, the pre-
liminary examination has been criticized as "expensive, inefficient, and
unsatisfactory for the prosecution, the defense, and the judiciary. ' 263 It
has been suggested that with increased pretrial discovery, the preliminary
examination can be scaled back.2 4 It remains to be seen whether the
Allen case will have that effect.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Allen decision made significant changes in criminal discovery in
Oklahoma. Although defendants are now entitled to more information,
the most far-reaching aspect of Allen is the extent to which defendants
must now provide information to the State. However, trial courts and
257. Id.
258. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 17.
259. Allen v. State, 527 P.2d 204, 207 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974).
260. Perkins v. State, 695 P.2d 1364, 1369 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (Parks, J., concurring);
Hampton v. State, 501 P.2d 523, 527 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); Beaird v. Ramey, 456 P.2d 587, 589
(Okla. Crim. App. 1969).
261. Beaird, 456 P.2d at 589-90; see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 259 (1991) (providing that the
defendant, as well as the State, may produce witnesses at the preliminary examination).





Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 28 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss1/3
1992] CRIMINAL DISCOVERY AFTER ALLEN 111
the court of criminal appeals must carefully monitor the discovery pro-
cess to avoid violating the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination.
Having revolutionized the criminal discovery process, the court of
criminal appeals must now clarify the remaining ambiguities after Allen.
For example, the court must determine whether defendants must provide
notice of alibi and mental condition defenses and, if so, the nature of that
notice. In addition, since these defenses are already regulated by statute,
the court must determine whether the Allen sanctions may appropriately
be applied for noncompliance. Perhaps the greatest decision awaiting the
court, though, is the extent to which the expanded pretrial discovery pro-
vided for in Allen should result in the diminution of the preliminary ex-
amination as a discovery device for defendants.
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